Since the Cold War, the United States has maintained a nuclear posture of Launch on Warning, meaning that the US has an official policy of retaliating with nuclear weapons at the threat or warning of a nuclear launch by another nation. If another country were to announce a nuclear strike, the US would respond with retaliatory strikes in mere minutes. Such policy was intended to be strictest and most evident indication towards the Soviet Union that the US wholeheartedly embraced the idea of mutually assured destruction, as to minimize the chance of nuclear war. Fortunately the Cold War is over and the world is slowly in the process of disarmament; however, the US policy of Launch on Warning is still in effect, which has drastic consequences in the case of miscalculation. Very few people believe an intentional nuclear war would ever happen, but accidental launch is too high for comfort.
The high frequency of false alarms in uncomfortably high. The Freedom of Information Act has shown us that there are on average 144 false alarms per year, ranging from anything from comets on radars, unusual weather patterns, or computer glitches on either our end or Russia's. Normally this isn't an issue since each alarm is investigated and corrected. The issue is simultaneous false alarms- one on radar and one on satellite. Such case would almost certainly lead to retaliation given the minutes Launch on Warning dictates for response time. Statistical modeling has demonstrated that the probability of overlapping false alarms is once every 15 years, which arguably means we are "overdue" for such an occurrence. A similar series of events is also likely on Russia's side. For example in 1989, a Russian colonel refused to obey orders to retaliate when a radar detected incoming nuclear missiles from the US. He had correctly guessed that it was merely a satellite error and arguably saved humanity from a US-Russia nuclear war. It's clear that Launch on Warning is severely outdated, as nuclear weapons technology has not improved since their creation. Adopting a softer nuclear posture is the only way to truly eliminate the risk of accidental US-Russia nuclear war.
-Amit Bilgi
Sources:
http://www.abolitionforum.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-116340083.html
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08929882.2013.798984#.VBup5vldWPU
The high frequency of false alarms in uncomfortably high. The Freedom of Information Act has shown us that there are on average 144 false alarms per year, ranging from anything from comets on radars, unusual weather patterns, or computer glitches on either our end or Russia's. Normally this isn't an issue since each alarm is investigated and corrected. The issue is simultaneous false alarms- one on radar and one on satellite. Such case would almost certainly lead to retaliation given the minutes Launch on Warning dictates for response time. Statistical modeling has demonstrated that the probability of overlapping false alarms is once every 15 years, which arguably means we are "overdue" for such an occurrence. A similar series of events is also likely on Russia's side. For example in 1989, a Russian colonel refused to obey orders to retaliate when a radar detected incoming nuclear missiles from the US. He had correctly guessed that it was merely a satellite error and arguably saved humanity from a US-Russia nuclear war. It's clear that Launch on Warning is severely outdated, as nuclear weapons technology has not improved since their creation. Adopting a softer nuclear posture is the only way to truly eliminate the risk of accidental US-Russia nuclear war.
-Amit Bilgi
Sources:
http://www.abolitionforum.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-116340083.html
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08929882.2013.798984#.VBup5vldWPU